Do wage subsidies affect the subsequent employment stability of permanent workers?: the case of Spain by Yolanda Rebollo Sanz & J. Ignacio García-Pérez
 
 
    Working papers series 




WP ECON 09.18 
 
 
Do wage subsidies affect the subsequent 
employment stability of permanent  
workers?: the case of Spain  
 
J. Ignacio García-Pérez (U. Pablo de Olavide & FEDEA & 
FCEA) 
 








JEL Classification numbers: J38, J68 
 
Keywords: labour market rotation, permanent contracts, wage 
subsidies, triple difference, causal inference, average treatment 










Do wage subsidies affect the subsequent employment 
stability of permanent workers?: the case of Spain 
* 
 
J. Ignacio García-Pérez      Yolanda F. Rebollo Sanz 




This article studies how job creation subsidies designed for several Spanish regional governments to foster the 
creation of new permanent contracts during the period 1997-2004 might affect the subsequent employment stability 
of the eligible workers. We use a triple difference approach that focuses on regional and temporal variability in 
individual eligibility conditions of these subsidies to obtain the causal effect of the policy. Our data comes from the 
Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) and from a database that contains information on the policy analyzed. 
Our main result is that workers who are eligible for these subsidies face a higher probability of exiting from their 
current permanent contract than those who do not. These effects vary by age and gender, as well as by contract 
duration and contract type. This result is particularly relevant for male workers whose contracts also benefited with 
nationally subsidized payroll deductions and for women with such deductions but only during their first year of 
employment. During that initial first-year period, the exit rate among eligible workers in our sample increased by 9%, 
21% and 16% for younger, middle-aged and older female workers, respectively, and by about 13% and 25% for 
younger and older male workers, respectively.  
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1  Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, rising temporary employment rates in Spain have induced the national 
and some regional governments to implement a number of active labour market policies 
(ALMPs) designed to bolster the number of permanent hires and thus to forestall the perceived 
threat of temporary contracts over the country’s economic efficiency and equity. Indeed, Spain 
invests more public funding in this type of ALMP than does any other OECD country. Between 
1999 and 2002, for example, it dedicated roughly 0.28% of national output to this end (0.4% in 
2006). Yet between 1996 and 2006, the proportion of permanently employed Spanish workers 
rose by a mere 0.3 percentage points, from 66.4% in 1996 to 66.7% in 2006. 
This paper focuses on labour market policies that use targeted subsidies to increase employment 
stability. Since 1997, when the national government issued an important labour market reform 
(see Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz, 2003 or Mendez, 2008 for a description) many Spanish 
regional governments have offered one-time payments to firms issuing new permanent contracts 
to certain groups of workers.
2 In our initial evaluation of this policy (García-Pérez and Rebollo, 
2009), we concluded that the causal incidence of such subsidies over the entrance probability to 
a permanent contract was very low;
3 specifically, our results indicated that while such subsidies 
increased by 67% the conversion of temporary to permanent contracts re-hired by the same firm 
among eligible female workers aged between 30 and 45, it had no effect on other groups of 
temporary workers. However, the rise in this conversion rate (from 0.65% to 1.09%) was so 
small as to be economically irrelevant in terms of its final effect over permanent employment. 
We also obtained that the incidence of the subsidies over the pool of unemployed workers was 
only statistically significant among workers younger than 30, for whom the increase in the 
transition probability to a permanent contract for eligible workers ranged from 4% for female 
workers to 10% for male ones.  
Despite this evidence, the available data on regional expenditure rates shows that such subsidies 
have been used intensively in some regions,
4 where they represent a significant reduction in 
labour costs. In fact, cross-regionally, the joint availability of both national and regional 
subsidies can reduce the total labour costs of the average worker’s first two years of permanent 
contract by 15.4% for women aged 30 to 45, and by almost 22.8% for older female workers. It 
                                                 
2 These subsidies, as we discuss later in this paper, target unemployed workers and workers with temporary contracts 
who obtain permanent ones under the same employer.  
3 The results of this paper accord with those obtained in other studies that evaluate the causal incidence of the 
different national labour market reforms implemented in Spain since 1994. That is, employer hiring policies seem to 
experience no significant change in response to the 1997 and 2001 reforms (Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz, 2003; 
Arellano, 2005). In Mendez (2008), the author concludes that the reforms of 1994 and 1997 only increased the 
probability of transitioning from unemployment to permanent employment. Cebrian, Moreno and Toharia (2005) 
show that firing costs do not appear to be the main element in the determination of the proportion of employees with 
a temporary contract in Spain.  
4 In García Pérez and Rebollo (2007) we show that regional wage subsidies are used most intensively in Murcia, 








seems that regional subsidies affect total labour costs to a greater degree than do national ones. 
In fact, only between 3.6% and 10.4% of this cost reduction can be attributed to national payroll 
tax deductions. 
The available literature indicates no overall positive effect of these ALMPs on the permanent 
employment rate. Katz (1994) shows that in a world marked by wage rigidities, the cost of 
labour drops when a firm receives a subsidy. If this cost reduction occurs during the worker’s 
term of employment, the subsidy can, in fact, increase job’s length. However, if the subsidy 
consists of a one-time payment at the beginning of the contract its effects on employment 
duration are more uncertain. In particular, in a situation where labour costs increase with the 
duration of the contract, the relevance of any subsidy-induced drop in labour costs diminishes as 
contract tenure increases. Hence, subsidized workers may in fact have shorter employment 
durations than other worker groups, particularly when the worker hired under a subsidized 
contract would not otherwise have been offered a position. The idea is that job creation 
subsidies counterbalance the lower labour productivity of eligible workers as compared against 
ineligible ones. In addition, the literature on causal evaluation points to a number of other 
unforeseen consequences of these policies. For instance, Calmfors (1994) argues that 
subsidizing permanent hires carries deadweight costs and substitution effects, which make it 
hard to evaluate the net effect of that strategy.
5 Martin and Grub (2001) argue that most 
evaluations focusing on firm behaviour have pointed to large deadweight and substitution 
effects when private-sector employment is subsidized. As a result, such schemes yield small net 
employment gains.
6 In a more recent paper, Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) show that job 
creation subsidies
7 might increase labour market rotation. Following this lead, the aim of this 
paper is to assess whether regional subsidies may favour the labour market rotation of eligible 
workers, by reducing the average duration of their subsidized permanent contracts. In broader 
terms, we wish to contribute to current knowledge regarding the effect of job creation subsidies 
on employer hiring and firing practices. 
This evaluation exercise draws on sample data taken from the “Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales (MCVL-2005)”, a database compiled in 2005 by the Spanish Social Security 
administration. For the purposes of this paper, we have also compiled a database that provides 
detailed cross-regional information on the eligibility conditions for the regional subsidies we 
have been discussing—those that aim to bolster permanent employment designed by regional 
                                                 
5 Deadweight costs refer to the hiring activities that benefited from the policy, but that would have taken place even 
in its absence. Substitution effects mean that some subsidized contracts are used to substitute other contracts held by 
ineligible workers, since one of the effect of the policy is to create a gap between the labour costs associated with 
hiring eligible workers versus ineligible ones. In his work, Calmfors shows that these effects reduce the proportion of 
regular employment (unsubsidized jobs) and increase that of irregular employment, although he does not discuss how 
subsidies affect overall employment. 
6 For instance, evaluations of wage subsidies in Australia, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands have suggested 
combined deadweight and substitution effects amounting to around 90 per cent, implying that for every 100 jobs 
subsidised by these schemes only ten were net gains in employment. 
7 They distinguish between employment subsidies, wage subsidies and hiring subsidies. An employment subsidy is an 
employment-contingent flow paid throughout the duration of a job-worker match. A wage subsidy can be regarded as 
a reduction in the payroll tax. A hiring subsidy is a payment that can be either a direct transfer to the employer or a 








governments —for the years 1997 through 2004, the only period for which relevant data is 
available.
8 One outstanding characteristic of the MCVL is that it allows us to observe contract 
modifications occurring within a single employment spell. Without this information, we would 
have risked biasing the estimated effect of the policy’s causal incidence by excluding those who 
had worked first as temporary and then as permanent workers under the same employer, with no 
employment gap between the two contracts. Other valuable information provided by this dataset 
refers to the identification of those contracts that are benefited from discounts in payroll taxes at 
the national level. This information also enables us to measure where the causal effect of the 
policy differs by type of indefinite contract. This kind of information can not be found in other 
labour market databases.  
We estimate a single risk duration model for a sample of workers with permanent contracts. 
Since our policy variable –the hiring subsidy-, varies by region, year and individual eligibility 
conditions, we use a triple difference approach to identify its causal effect over the exit rate 
from the permanent contract. When determining causal inference, it is crucial to properly define 
the control and treatment groups. In the interests of obtaining a homogeneous database, our 
reference sample only includes individuals whose prior employment records made them eligible 
for regional subsidies. That is, since these subsidies specifically target workers with unstable 
employment histories (unemployed and temporary workers), our estimation sample is 
comprised of only those workers whose employment history rendered them eligible for 
subsidized hire at the time of sampling. Within this overall pool, workers whose year of 
employment, region, age and/or gender rendered them eligible for such funding are included in 
the treated group; workers rendered ineligible for subsidy on the basis of these same criteria are 
placed in the control group. 
Our main results show that both the worker’s eligibility status and her contract length and type –
with or without discounts in payroll taxes-, must be considered when measuring the influence of 
regional subsidization on the exit rate from a permanent contract. We find that such subsidies 
indeed increase the exit rate from permanent employment among eligible workers, particularly 
those whose permanent contracts also provides for national payroll tax deductions. Thus, during 
the first year of employment, the exit rate among eligible workers increases by 9% to 21% for 
female workers and by 13% to 25% for male workers. Since quarterly exit rates increase from 
4.1% to 5.1% for eligible women and from 2.9% to 3.2% for eligible men, these estimated 
effects would appear to be relevant from an economic point of view. Nevertheless for certain 
cases we obtain the opposite result, i.e., a decreased exit rate among eligible workers. This result 
particularly arises for workers aged 45 and over, after their first year of employment. However, 
looking at the net effect of theses subsidies on predicted employment duration we observe that 
average duration decreases for eligible workers, versus illegible ones, by 20.52% for women 
aged 45 and over and by around 9-10% for older male workers and female middle-age ones. 
                                                 








Hence, the increase in the hazard for the first year of the contract seems to dominate to the 
opposite result found for some workers after one year has elapsed.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections two and three describe the data and the 
econometric model used for our analysis. Our main results are discussed in section four, and 
section five presents our main conclusions.  
2  Data   
The data for this evaluation exercise derives from two sources. Comprehensive employment 
histories for a sample of workers were drawn from the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales 
(MCVL), a database compiled and published by the Spanish Social Security administration.
9 In 
addition, regional eligibility requirements and subsidy amounts were taken from a dataset 
compiled by ourselves for the purpose of evaluating the policies discussed here (See García 
Pérez and Rebollo, 2007 for further details).  
2.1     Regional Subsidies 
Regional subsidies are entirely independent of those administered through the national 
government, but both offer essentially two kinds of aid: that intended to help unemployed 
workers find permanent work, and that which aims to shift temporary workers into permanent 
positions within the same firm. Thus, an employee from our sample of permanent workers is 
assumed to have benefited from the subsidy only if she had been previously unemployed or had 
held a temporary contract with the same employer. Many regional governments further narrow 
the pool of eligible workers by targeting those for whom it is most difficult to obtain permanent 
work. In such cases, if an unemployed worker had held a temporary contract in her previous job, 
she was eligible for subsidization regardless of how much time had elapsed between the end of 
that job and the beginning of the one sampled. However, if her previous contract had been a 
permanent one, she was only eligible if she had been unemployed for longer than three months 
at the time of hiring (if the new job was with a new employer) or if she has been two years out 
of the firm (if the new employer is the same than in the previous job). All of these eligibility 
requirements, which relate to the worker’s previous job spell, are considered in our analysis. 
The main eligibility requirements –additionally to those referred to the characteristics of the 
worker´s prior labour market position explained above-, for the regional subsidies analyzed here 
are given in Table 1 (for male workers) and Table 2 (for female ones). They show the policy 
years, region of application, and eligibility rules regarding age and gender for workers in each 
of the two target groups: (1) temporary employees who move into permanent positions under 
                                                 








the same employer, and (2) unemployed workers who obtain permanent positions. Table 2 
shows the average wage subsidy (in 2002 euros) by age and gender for each region.
10  
Table 1: Regional Incentives: Eligibility Conditions by Age and Gender across Spanish 
Regions (Males, 1997-2004) 
 Unemployed  Temporary  Contract 
all ages  1997-2002  18-30  1997-2002 
Andalusia 




1999-2003  18-40 2002-2004 
Aragon 
40 and over  1998-2004  40 and over  1998-2004 
all ages  1997, 2001  all ages  1997-1998, 2000-2003 
Asturias 
18-30 and >45  1998, 2000, 2002    
Balearic Islands  NO    NO   
18-25 1.998 18-25  1.998 
Canary Islands 
all ages  1.999  NO  NO 
all ages  1998, 2000-2004 18-30  1998, 2001-2004 
Cantabria 
    45 and over  1998, 2000-2004 
C. Leon  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2004 
16-30 1.998 16-30  1.998 
C. Mancha 
16-29 & 45 and over 1999-2003  45 and over  1999-2003 
Catalunya NO    NO   
all ages  1998-2001, 
2003-2004  18-30  1998-2001, 
2003-2004  Valencia 
    45 and over  1998-2000 
Extremadura  all ages  1997-2004  all ages  1997-2004 
18-30 & 45 and over 1998  18-30 & 45 and over 1998 
Galicia 
all ages  1999-2004  all ages  1999-2004 
Madrid  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1999-2004 
Murcia  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2004 
Navarra NO    NO   
Basque Country  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2004 
Rioja  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2003 
  Source: García-Perez and Rebollo (2007) 
 
A close look at Tables 1 and 2 shows that regional recourse to this kind of policy varies widely; 
hence, some regions only began to implement the policy in 1997 while others, such as Catalonia 
and Navarra, have never offered such subsidies. Individual eligibility rules also show significant 
                                                 
10 Although in Table 2 we give the average wage subsidy, in the estimation presented below we have matched the 
wage subsidy to each eligible worker in accordance with the year of hiring, her age, gender, and of course with her 
type of prior labour market position since in some regions wage subsidies differ between unemployed an temporary 








regional and temporal variations for workers of both genders, and especially for men; in several 
regions, these eligibility conditions also varied by the worker’s prior labour state at the time of 
hire. For instance, regions such as Extremadura and the Basque Country offered subsidies 
targeted at all worker groups, while in the Balearic Islands they were reserved for women and in 
Valencia and the Canary Islands they mainly targeted younger workers. In some regions, 
including Aragón, Asturias, Castile-La Mancha and Valencia, eligibility conditions also varied 
according to the worker’s most recent job spell and state of employment at the time of hire.  
Table 2: Regional Incentives: Eligibility Conditions by Age and Gender across Spanish 
Regions (Females, 1997-2004) 
 Unemployed  Temporary  Contract 
Andalusia  all ages  1997-2002  all ages  1997-2002 
Aragon  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2004 
Asturias  all ages  1997-1998, 2000-2003 all ages  1997-1998, 2000-2003 
Balearic Islands  all ages  2000-2004  all ages  2000-2004 
all ages  1.998  all ages  1.998 
Canary Islands 
all ages  1.999  all ages  1.999 
all ages  1998, 2000-2004  18-30  1998, 2001-2004 
Cantabria 
    30 and over 1998, 2000-2004 
C. Leon  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2004 
all ages  1.998  all ages  1.998 
C. Mancha 
all ages  1999-2003  all ages  1999-2003 
Catalunya NO    NO   
all ages  1998-2004  18-45  1998-2004 
Valencia 
    45 and over 1998-2000 
Extremadura  all ages  1997-2004  all ages  1997-2004 
all ages  1.998  all ages  1.998 
Galicia 
all ages  1999-2004  all ages  1999-2004 
Madrid  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2004 
Murcia  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2004 
Navarra NO    NO   
Basque Country  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2004 
Rioja  all ages  1998-2004  all ages  1998-2003 
    Source: García-Perez and Rebollo (2007) 
 
Table 3 also indicates several regional variations in terms of subsidy amount. First, the high 
subsidies offered in regions such as Madrid or Extremadura (6.674 and 7.818 Euros per 
contract, in average terms) contrasts strikingly with the much lower ones offered in areas like 
Valencia or Galicia (where they fall to 1.807 and 2.639 Euros, respectively, on average). 








regional subsidies seem to be higher for women and older workers than they are for men and 
younger ones. It should be stressed that these regional subsidies represent a significant discount 
in labour costs. In fact, the joint availability of both national and regional subsidies may reduce 
the total labour costs associated with the average worker during his or her first two years of 
permanent contract from 13.5% for men aged 30 to 45 to almost 21.5% for young female 
workers, across regions.  
Table 3: Regional Incentives: Average Subsidies by age and gender  
 Males  Females 
  Age < 30  Age 30-45  Age > 45  Age < 30  Age 30-45  Age > 45 
Andalusia 3,202  2,402 2,402 3,202  3,304  3,304 
Aragon 2,850  2,888  4,317  3,137 2,870  3,030 
Asturias 2,650  2,250  2,854  3,187 3,100 3,350 
Balearic Islands  0  0  3,005  2,854  1,464  2,854 
Canary Islands  3,000  3,600 3,400 3,000  3,000  3,000 
Cantabria 2,423  2,400  3,040 3,239  3,077  3,478 
C. Leon  3,456  2,401  2,401 3,456  2,651  2,651 
C. Mancha  3,000  0  2,760  3,440  3,440  3,440 
Catalunya 0  0  0  0  0  0 
Valencia 1,424  1,400  1,400 2,584  2,584  2,854 
Extremadura 5,379  6,158  8,944  5,896  5,896  8,454 
Galicia 2,300  1,900  2,100 3,200  3,200  3,200 
Madrid 7,200  7,200  7500  8,100 8,100  8,100 
Murcia 3,540  2,850  3,214 3,540  3,514  3,514 
Navarra 0  0    0  0  0 
Basque Country  4,440  4,301 4,443 4,666  4,533  5,525 
Rioja 3,844  3,006  3,757  4,700  4,700  4,700 
Total  4,621 5,036 5,010  4,498  4,564  4,797 
 Source: García-Pérez and Rebollo (2007) 
 
To compare these variations in the average cost reduction brought about by regional subsidies 
for different types of workers in different regions, Table 4 presents the cost reduction associated 
with both nationally-subsidized payroll tax deductions and regional subsidies for the year 2002, 
for each type of worker. Total labour costs in this table are computed for the first two years of 
employment under a permanent contract, during which it is assumed that the worker does not 
leave her job, i.e., that there is no firing cost involved.  The resulting data show that, on average, 
regional subsidies cover 16% of total labour costs. Only in regions where there are no wage 
subsidies (in cursive) does the percentage of labour costs saved drop below 10%. For all other 
regions these savings are quite substantial –they are greatest in Madrid—especially for female 
and older workers. For a firm that fires a worker with a severance payment of 45 days per year 
worked, such payments represent about 10% of the wage and payroll taxes paid by the firm in 
the previous two years. One indication of the importance of the subsidization approach is the 
fact that employers are more than fully compensated for such firing costs in nearly every region 
offering such subsidies. Notice that these firing costs will be even lower for the new indefinite 








Table 4: Average discount in labour costs due to both National and Regional subsidies in the 
year 2002 
 Males  Females 
  Age < 30  Age 30-45  Age > 45  Age < 30  Age 30-45  Age > 45 
Andalusia  18,43% 14,38% 18,35% 21,37% 18,75% 24,29% 
Aragon  15,28% 13,35% 17,28% 18,90% 16,91% 23,41% 
Asturias  9,75% 13,97% 16,97% 19,91% 17,45% 22,06% 
Balearic Islands  12,90% 8,35% 15,99% 14,90% 10,72%  19,31% 
Canary Islands  3,63% 3,63% 8,61% 4,53% 4,53%  10,43% 
Cantabria  12,77% 14,02% 19,21% 22,45% 17,56% 24,49% 
C. Leon  13,91% 11,93% 16,49% 18,28% 15,79% 23,06% 
C. Mancha  19,29% 11,96% 16,57% 21,84% 14,55% 20,30% 
Catalunya  3,63% 3,63% 8,61% 4,53% 4,53%  10,43% 
Valencia  9,11% 8,58% 11,94% 13,18% 12,85%  16,45% 
Extremadura  10,88% 10,88% 25,84% 13,60% 13,60% 31,28% 
Galicia  9,76% 8,86% 13,52% 12,99% 11,90%  17,98% 
Madrid  41,26% 33,20% 35,93% 45,73% 37,73% 44,20% 
Murcia  21,00% 18,54% 22,99% 25,37% 22,42% 25,62% 
Navarra  3,63% 3,63% 8,61% 4,53% 4,53%  10,43% 
Basque Country  12,10% 10,48% 24,12% 31,18% 18,80% 38,18% 
Rioja  13,11% 11,36% 15,53% 21,61% 20,56% 25,01% 
      Source: García-Pérez and Rebollo (2007) and own calculations based on the MCVL. 
 
2.2   Labour Market Data for Individual Workers 
Our data on workers’ individual employment histories was taken from the 2005 edition of the 
Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL hereafter). The MCVL is a sample of more than 
one million worker case-histories which provides very detailed information about their current 
and previous labour activities including the worker’s wage category, type of contract and 
reasons for its termination, as well as the hiring firm’s size, age, ownership, location and 
activity sector, among other job and firm characteristics. Since the database assigns each worker 
the corresponding identification code for the firm where she works, it allows us detecting 
whether or not a specific worker changed firms when moving from one employment spell to the 
next. Obviously, this is a critical factor in our research, since the eligibility requirements for the 
regional subsidies studied here
11 take into account whether a would-be candidate for subsidized 
employment has previously worked with the same hiring firm. 
In terms of contract type, the MCVL provides two other groups of relevant data that are 
available in no other database. First, it tells us whether or not the worker’s contract was a 
permanent one and, if so, whether or not he benefited from national payroll tax deductions. 
Consequently, in this analysis we distinguish between permanent contracts that also included 
national subsidies, and those that did not.
12 Second, the database allows us to observe contract 
                                                 
11 This information is also relevant for the national payroll tax deduction policy.  
12 The 1997 national reform gave rise to a new type of permanent contract with lower firing costs (named “Contrato 
de Fomento de la Contratación Indefinida”). However, our dataset does not allow us to identify whether each 








modifications taking place during a single employment spell; for example, it indicates whether 
the worker began her current job as a temporary worker and then obtained a permanent position 
with the same firm, or whether she originally held a permanent contract subject to national 
payroll tax deductions before moving into a new permanent contract with no such benefits. 
Disregarding this critical information might have led to a bias in the estimated causal effect, 
since it would have caused us to exclude from our eligible group those who had worked for as 
temporary workers with a given employer before becoming permanent ones. It would also have 
potentially biased the effect of the causal incidence of the national policy over the entrance 
probability into a permanent contract, by falsely lowered the observed number of permanent 
contracts that included national payroll tax deductions. 
We measure the duration of each contract in quarters and on the basis of the specified starting 
and ending dates. Since the database also gives the ending dates for each contract modification, 
we also compute contract durations that take into account any variations that may have occurred 
within the same employment spell.
13 Likewise, we compute the duration of each unemployment 
spell by measuring the time lapse between the end date of the worker’s previous contract and 
the start date of her new one.  
In order to obtain a more homogeneous and comprehensive estimation sample, we have applied 
the following rules when selecting the employment spells for our sample. First, when two 
employment spells overlapped such that one of the spells encompassed the other, we used only 
the longer one.
14 Second, when two employment spells were simultaneous at a given point in 
time (but not all of the time)
15 we kept only the most recent one; however, when the 
simultaneity lasted for less than 15 days, we treated both spells as part of a job-to-job 
transition.
16 Third, we only consider employment spells from the so called “Régimen General”, 
censoring any spells that lead to a position outside of this category.
17 Fourth, the final sample is 
composed by workers aged between 18 and 60 years. Finally, we omit all job spells for which 
any information is missing.
18 As we pointed out in the introduction, we are only interested in the 
duration of the employment spells when the job is a permanent one. Hence, once we had 
finished selecting our data according to the above rules, we eliminated spells not associated with 
permanent contracts.  
                                                                                                                                               
national subsidies (66%, according to the information offered by the Public Employment Agency on subsidized 
contracts in 2006) also specify low firing costs. 
13 That is, we use two variables from the MCVL-2005 called the “first contract modification” and “second contract 
modification”.   
14 For instance, when we observe an employment spell for the period 2000-2001 and another one for the period 1999-
2002 we omit the first one and we keep only the second one for our sample. 
15 That is, when the first contract ends after the second contract has begun. 
16 In this sense, we assume that the unemployment duration in this case is zero and we consider both spells as a 
unique employment spell.  
17 This definition includes the pool of regular paid employees for any given firm. 
18 For instance, lack of information regarding the contract beginning or ending dates and, more importantly, regarding 
contract type. This last restriction is the reason why we begin to collect data from 1995 onwards. Before 1995 the 
information on contract types suffers from a high percentage of non-observation. On the contrary, from 1995, this is 








In causal analysis a proper definition of the treated and control group is crucial to obtaining an 
unbiased estimate of the policy. In order to obtain a homogeneous sample of workers,
19 and in 
light of the restrictions imposed by the policy in terms of the worker’s employment status and 
her most recent job spell, we keep a sample of permanent workers whose previous experience 
rendered them eligible for subsidization. Hence, all workers whose most recent contract had 
been a permanent one and who had been unemployed for less than three months at the time of 
hiring (or 24 months in the case of re-employment in the same firm) were deemed ineligible and 
eliminated from our estimation sample, regardless of their age or gender.
20  
3  Descriptive Evidence    
Let us now take a closer look at our final sample of workers with permanent contracts. Table 5 
gives its main characteristics by age and gender. Here we observe, first of all, that contract 
duration as well as the percentage of censored observations are increasing with age.
21 Thus, 
average tenure ranges from 7 quarters (for older women) to 11.7 (for older men).  
We can also see in this table, that more than 59% of the observed spells were associated with a 
permanent contract from the outset. Interestingly, this number tends to be greater among female 
workers, rising to 81% among older female ones. The remaining workers began their current 
spell under a temporary contract before moving to a permanent position within the same firm. 
Hence, these statistics highlight the importance of taking into account contract modifications, 
since we have found that between 10% and 30% of our spells began as temporary ones. In the 
absence of this information, we would have classified as ineligible a significant number of 
employees holding permanent contracts who may have benefited from the policy analyzed here. 
The portion of permanent contracts carrying national payroll tax deductions is significant for all 
age groups. Obviously, the national eligibility rules for this type of contract (see Mendez, 2008) 
means that only about 26% of men aged between 30 and 45 held it from the time they began 
their spell of permanent employment. For certain group of workers, however, the majority of 
these contracts benefited from national payroll tax deductions. For instance, 48% of female 
workers under 30 and over 45 years of age with permanent contracts also had national 
deductions. This rate rises to 59% among older male workers.  
 
                                                 
19 As it is well known (see, for example, Meyer, 1995), this is a basic requirement of any well defined difference-in-
difference estimation. 
20 The number of employment spells that become ineligible given their previous unemployment spell’s duration is 
quite large. They are around 23% for young workers, 48% for those aged 30-45 and almost 59% of all the observed 
employment spells of workers aged more than 45. Thus, it seems that the rotation across permanent contracts is also 
quite standard, especially among not very young workers. As explained in the text, these transitions are not 
considered in our estimation sample given they are not fulfilling one of the basic requisites of the policy analyzed. 








Table 5: Main characteristics of the estimation sample, by age and gender  
  < 30  30-45  > 45 
 Women Men  Women  Men  Women  Men 
Current Spell          
Contract Duration (completed spells) 8.4  9.9  7.9  10.7  7.0  11.7 
% of Censored Observations  46.29% 47.18%  54.44% 53.09%  56.33%  56.42% 
Perm. contract since the beginning of 
the spell  66.98% 63.99%  65.07% 59.99%  81.55%  81.22% 
Perm. Contract with national 
subsidies  48.04% 38.30%  33.71% 26.17%  48.17%  59.88% 
Part-Time 22.59%  9.80%  29.00% 6.90%  32.38%  5.86% 
Layoff  56.89% 47.49%  77.08% 64.13%  87.77%  74.71% 
New Firm  26.81%  24.93%  26.33% 30.98%  24.99%  34.50% 
Private Firm  95.66%  97.40%  89.15% 94.67%  89.71%  94.80% 
Sector of Activity          
Industry  14.56% 28.36%  17.31% 29.88%  18.12%  38.00% 
Construction  2.03% 8.40%  1.61% 8.33% 1.31%  11.09% 
Services  85.41% 63.24%  81.07% 61.78%  80.57%  50.91% 
Firm Size          
<  5  employees  41.42% 36.15%  38.28% 34.48%  38.80%  36.08% 
5-20 employees  16.60%  18.39%  14.22% 16.41%  13.33%  14.61% 
20-100 employees  18.05%  21.41%  19.01% 21.37%  18.27%  19.03% 
>  100  employees  23.93% 24.04%  28.49% 27.73%  29.60%  30.28% 
Age  24.98 25.11  36.63 36.66 50.29  50.57 
Immigrant  3.07% 2.95%  3.15% 3.41% 1.42%  1.40% 
Qualification          
High  12.08% 13.76%  14.63% 20.28% 8.50% 18.50% 
Medium-High 24.66%  20.29%  24.14% 22.75%  18.51%  21.20% 
Medium-Low 37.09%  33.62%  27.25% 36.09%  22.91%  39.84% 
Low  26.17% 32.33%  33.98% 20.88%  50.07%  20.46% 
Previous Trajectory          
Previous Unemployment Spell 
(months)  5.87 6.41  6.58 5.70  6.39  6.65 
Nº of Temp. Contracts  3.7 3.6  3.8 3.6 3.3  2.9 
Nº of Unemployment Spells  2.9 3.2  5.2 5.9 5.2  6.5 
Number of Spells  90,967  111,291  42,172  57,089  15,433  23,790 
 
The rest of employment characteristics of the workers in our estimation sample differ markedly 
by age and especially by gender, reinforcing the importance of carrying out gender-specific 
estimations of the model. Part-time jobs were more common among female workers than among 
male ones, with the percentage of workers holding such jobs ranging from 6% among middle-
aged men to 29% among women over the age of 45. The main reason for leaving a job was 
involuntary separation. The percentage of workers for whom this was the case increases by age 
and varies from 47% (young male workers) to 87% (older female ones). The proportion of 
sampled workers holding jobs in the service sector was greater for women than for men, while 
the opposite was true of industry-sector jobs. While gender-based differences regarding firm 








did. Finally, high-skill jobs were more common among men and older workers than they were 
among women and younger ones. 
The final rows of Table 5 provide data on the worker’s job experience just prior to taking the 
permanent position analyzed. For workers who had been previously unemployed, this period of 
unemployment lasted an average of five to seven months. Employees generally experienced 
quite a few temporary and/or unemployment spells prior to the permanent contract under study. 
Specifically, the number of temporary contracts held during this period ranged from 2.9 (for 
male workers over the age of 45) to 3.8 (for female workers under the age of 30). The number 
of unemployment spells varied from 2.9 among younger male workers to 5.9 among middle-
aged female ones.  
Workers with permanent contract can experience different type of jobs transitions depending on 
the type of contract in the new job and whether they experience an unemployment spell in 
between or not (Table 6). Here we focus on those transitions scenarios that represent a risk to 
the worker’s labour market stability. Hence, we classify the observed spells into two different 
job-transition destination states whenever one is observed (that is, when the unemployment spell 
is finished by entering into a new job): a worker in transition either found a new permanent job 
or got a job as a temporary worker after a certain unemployment spell.
22 Two other transition 
scenarios were censored from our duration analysis: when the employee returns to the same firm 
after a spell of unemployment lasting less than one month, and when she begins working with a 
different firm after having been unemployed for less than one week.
23  
In general terms, a high proportion of the observed transitions tend to lead to temporary 
contracts. This suggests that, for the workers in our sample, holding a permanent contract did 
not guarantee that the next contract would be a permanent one. Nevertheless, a number of 
interesting gender-based differences in this regard can be observed. For male workers, the more 
likely exit was to a temporary contract. Over 60% of the observed transitions show this type of 
transition, with this rate decreasing slightly by age. Among female workers, the results vary 
widely by age group. The probability of obtaining a temporary contract after ending the 
observed permanent contract decreases sharply as the worker’s age increases, falling from 60% 
for younger workers to 53% and 43% for middle-aged and older female workers, respectively.  
                                                 
22 A third option is lapsed into unemployment from which there is no observed exit. Employment transitions that end 
into unemployment with no observed exit correspond with censored unemployment spells. These transitions are not 
relevant from the analysis since they vary from 0.56% -older male workers-, to 1.16% -older female ones.   
23 We have observed that a significant number of job-to-job transitions take place during the first week of 
unemployment and that more than 50% of them lead to a new permanent contract. As explained in the text, we are 









Table 6: Employment Transitions by Age and Gender (1995-2004) 
 <30 30-45 >  45 
 Women  Men  Women Men  Women Men 
Nº of Censored spells  42,317 52,933 23,058 30,347 8,657  13,559 
Nº of Completed Spells   48,650 58,358 19,114 26,742 6,776  10,231 
Exit to a Temp. Contract  64.12% 64.05% 53.00% 61.18% 42.96% 60.35% 
Exit to a new Perm. Contract  34.90% 35.01% 45.84% 37.87% 56.36% 39.10% 
Table 7: Main sample characteristics: eligible versus ineligible workers (1995-2004) 
 Women  Men 
  Ineligible Eligible Ineligible Eligible 
Age   32.6 33.0 33.9 35.0 
Current Spell      
Exit from the current perm. contract   31.75%  34.16%  27.99%  31.96% 
Contract  Duration  (Uncensored)  9.0 8.3 9.4 8.9 
Perm. Contract since the beginning of  the  spell 66.48% 69.11% 61.99% 67.86% 
Perm. Contract with national subsidies  22.82% 48.98% 31.93% 44.05% 
Part-Time Job  21.56%  30.34%  5.87%  8.84% 
Layoff  79.25% 84.32% 49.52% 65.25% 
Private  Firm  89.25% 90.25% 92.26% 93.54% 
Activity Sector      
Construction 2.52%  2.13%  11.99%  12.09% 
Services  84.47% 85.66% 64.50% 62.90% 
Industry  14.01% 12.21% 23.50% 25.01% 
Firm Size      
<  5  Employees  40.40% 41.26% 36.27% 38.80% 
5-20  Employees  18.74% 17.78% 20.66% 21.11% 
20-100  Employees  18.60% 17.64% 22.80% 21.65% 
>  100  Employees  24.27% 23.32% 21.27% 18.45% 
Job Qualification      
Highly  skilled  9.89%  10.37% 13.19% 13.29% 
Medium  skilled  to  highly  skilled  23.26% 22.02% 19.45% 17.92% 
Medium to low skilled  27.95%  35.28%  38.12%  37.60% 
Low  skilled  40.89% 32.32% 30.23% 31.19% 
Previous Spell      
Same  firm  61.04% 61.33% 60.12% 51.40% 
Previous Temp. Contract  87.08%   90.39%   87.99%   93.02%  
Nº of Temp. Contracts  3.5 3.4 3.5 3.7 
Nº of Spells of Unemployment  3.7 3.8 4.5 4.3 
%  of  Spells  43.47% 56.53% 54.59% 45.41% 
Nº of Spells  64584  83987  104905  87264 
 
Table 7 gives the main sample characteristics for eligible and non-eligible workers by gender. It 








which suggest that our control and treated groups are quite similar. Important differences do 
arise, however, when we consider the probability of exiting from the current contract, average 
contract length and type of contract held. Thus, ineligible workers tend to hold onto their current 
permanent positions longer and are less likely than eligible ones to exit from them. For example, 
about 28% of ineligible male workers exited from their current permanent contract, while this 
ratio rose to almost 32% among eligible ones. In the case of women, we observe that about 32% 
of ineligible workers exited from the current contract while this ratio increased to 34% among 
eligible ones. Interestingly, the share of workers whose permanent position at the time of 
sampling started out as a temporary one was greater among eligible workers (67% to 69%) than 
among ineligible ones (62% to 66%). The same can be observed with respect to national payroll 
tax deductions: eligible workers (44% to 48%) were more likely than ineligible ones (22% to 
31%) to benefit from such deductions. The latter result suggests that firms often ask for both 
regional subsidies and national ones (in the form of payroll tax deductions) when hiring a new 
worker. 
Table 8 shows the type of labour market transitions for eligible and non-eligible workers of each 
gender group
24. With regard to the spell following the current one, eligible workers appear to 
behave somewhat differently than non-eligible ones. Of particular interest is the fact that 
eligible workers are more likely (27% for women and 26% for men) to obtain a new permanent 
contract with national deductions in payroll taxes than are ineligible ones (23% for women and 
19% for men).  
Table 8: Labour Market Transitions by Eligibility and Gender (1995-2004) 
 Women  Men 
 Ineligible  Eligible  Ineligible  Eligible 
Temporary contract  52.66%  52.91%  54.44%  56.31% 
Perm. Contract  46.41%  46.23%  44.66%  43.00% 
      With national subsidies  23%  27%  19%  26% 
 
Finally, Figures 1 and 2 give the empirical exit rate from a permanent contract by gender for 
eligible versus ineligible workers. Here we find, first, that the exit rate tends to rise during the 
first year of the contract and decreases monotonically afterward. Second, when we compare the 
exit rate between eligible and ineligible workers we find that this rate tends to be higher among 
eligible workers regardless of gender, although the observed differences seem to be greater 
among female workers, particularly during the first year of hire. Third, the differences between 
eligible and ineligible workers with regard to the exit rate from a permanent contract vary in 
accordance with the duration of the contract, with the observed difference being a bit larger 
during the first year of employment. 
  
                                                 
24 As in Table 6, a third option is not exiting from unemployment after having being separated from the previous job. 
As before this transitions is highly insignificant as it varies from 0.69% (older male workers) to 0.93% for young 































Further differences arise when different types of permanent contracts are considered. Figures 3 
and 4 distinguish between workers holding permanent contracts with and without national 
payroll tax deductions. Here, the exit rate from permanent contract for those without national 
benefits is higher at the beginning of the employment spell and decreases substantially during 
the first two years of employment.  By contrast, the same exit rate for those benefiting from the 
tax deductions is basically flat, with almost no duration dependence. Interestingly, during the 
first year the exit rate of this type of nationally-subsidized contract remains lower than that from 
permanent contracts without national benefits. This fact may have something to do with the 
qualification rules and benefits associated with such nationally-supported contracts (national 































In sum, our dataset indicates that the risk of being separated from the job seems to be greater 
among eligible workers. We have also shown that the pool of eligible workers does not greatly 
differ from that of ineligible ones in terms of observed characteristics. On the basis of this 
evidence, one may be tempted to conclude that regional subsidies underlie the shorter 
employment spells observed for eligible workers. We attempt to disentangle the regional 
policy’s causal effect by estimating a duration model that uses a triple difference estimator. We 
have also provided evidence that suggests the combined use of regional subsidies and national 
payroll tax deductions. Nevertheless, since some eligibility requirements are common to both 
policies, our conditional approach must confirm any differential effect between the regional 
subsidies for workers holding permanent contracts with deductions in payroll taxes, in 








4  Econometric procedure: Identification and Estimation 
The aim of this paper is to measure whether regional subsidies cause or partly contribute to the 
observed differences in permanent contract duration among regional subsidies’ eligible versus 
ineligible workers. To this end, we estimate a duration model that establishes the determinants 
of the exit rate from the current permanent contract. We identify the average treatment effect of 
the policy under study for its three dimensions of variability (region, time period and individual 
eligibility rules). Thus, time variation across regions, regional variation across time and 
eligibility variations across regions and time allow us to identify the causal effect of regional 
subsidies over the duration of permanent contracts.   
4.1   Identification of the causal effect 
In this analysis, we use the term “eligible” rather than “treated” because our database lacks 
information on real treatment. Thus, while we are able to observe the worker’s individual 
characteristics and recent employment transitions, we do not know whether she finally benefited 
from the regional policy or not, when she was hired under a permanent contract. Likewise, we 
cannot observe whether the firms actually applied for the subsidy when hiring an eligible 
worker under a permanent contract. Consequently, the treatment effect we identify should be 
described as a “potential” effect, since we can only measure the policy benefits for workers who 
were potentially treatable, but who may or may not actually receive treatment. Nevertheless, 
given that such subsidies represent an important discount in hiring costs, it is reasonable to 
assume that most of eligible workers finally benefited from the policy. 
In this context, our model must be carefully and appropriately specified in order to capture all 
observed and unobserved differences between the treatment and the control group of workers. 
As discussed earlier, in order to maximize the similarity between workers in the treated and 
control groups, we have restricted our sample to all workers whose job histories just prior to 
sampling rendered them eligible for subsidized hire. The treatment group is comprised of 
workers eligible for subsidized hire on the basis of their age, gender and prior labour market 
position, who were living in the region offering the subsidy at the time of its implementation. 
Similarly, the control group is comprised of workers deemed ineligible on the basis of age or 
gender or prior labour market position, and who lived in a region -or time period- for which no 
such funding was available. 
Our triple difference model can be represented as follows: 
() ijt ij jt it t j i ijt ijt ijt D x t t P ε ψ ν ξ δ µ η β α λ + + + + + + + + + − = ' 0  (1) 
where i refers to individuals, j to regions and t to time (quarters); the function λ(t-t0) comprises 









25 The index Pijt is the argument of the probability statement being estimated as 
explained bellow. The variable that identifies the causal effect of the policy is Dijt, which takes 
the value of the maximum wage subsidy for each eligible worker with individual characteristics 
i, in region j and period t, and zero otherwise. The aim of our econometric exercise is to obtain 
an unbiased estimate of the effect of this variable on the exit rate from permanent employment. 
To do so, we must control for all the covariates that can simultaneously affect the treatment and 
outcome and that present individual, regional and temporal variations. García-Pérez and Rebollo 
(2009) present a detailed description of the identification approach used also here to assess the 
causal effect of the policy. Specifically, we control for temporal variation with annual dummy 
variables, δt, regional variation through regional dummy variables, µj, and individual variation 
in eligibility conditions, ηi, which are proxied by dummy variables that control for age groups 
and previous employment history.
26 Finally, we must also consider how these three dimensions 
interact with one another. Thus, νjt represents the interactions of regional dummy variables and 
temporal dummy variables which are grouped in three periods (1995-1996, 1997-2000 y 2001-
2004) for the purposes of identification; ψij represents the interaction of age group dummy 
variables with the regional ones; and ξit is represented by the interaction of age group and year 
dummy variables for the three periods specified above (1995-1996, 1997-2000 y 2001-2004). 
Note that the variables in this last group, as well as those contained in νjt,  play a crucial role in 
the identification of the causal effect of the regional policy, since an important national labour 
market reform which brought a new permanent contract and subsidies for new permanent 
contracts, was implemented during the same period and eligibility rules were also related to the 
age of the worker. 
Finally, the vector xijt comprises variables (contract type, job skill level, activity sector, firm 
size, firm ownership, and so on) that may differ by individual, region and time period and that 
allow us to control for observable differences between eligible and ineligible workers which 
could bias our results. Since the eligibility conditions also address the worker’s prior 
employment history, we also include variables that describe certain aspects of the worker’s job 
experience. These variables include the number of prior unemployment spells experienced by 
the worker and a set of binary variables that indicate whether her job position at the time of 
sampling corresponded to her first employment spell (denoted here as first spell), whether she 
previously had held a temporary contract and then been unemployed (temp. contract), and 
whether she had previously held a temporary contract with the same firm (conversion from 
temp. contract).  
Since we have also found interesting differences in the average duration of permanent contracts 
depending on whether they have national subsidies or not, we also perform a second exercise 
designed to assess whether the causal effect of the subsidies varies by contract type. While our 
                                                 




Their inclusion here is justified by the behaviour of the empirical exit rate shown in the statistical section. 
26 We also estimate each duration model separately for each of the two gender groups, given the previously shown 








first estimation covers the period 1995-2004, the second one is restricted to the years between 
1997 and 2004, given that data on national subsidies is only available from 1997 onward. It 
should be stressed that when estimating the model for the period from 1997 to 2004, we 
partially lose one dimension of our identification; since we drop all of the data corresponding to 
the period before the subsidy took effect. Yet we can still identify the average treatment effect 
of the policy in this case by looking at regional and temporal variability, as well as that 
regarding individual eligibility conditions.
27  
4.2   The estimation method 
For both exercises, we estimate a duration model using the single risk approach. Hence, our 
objective is to estimate the exit or hazard rate. A common strategy to estimating the hazard rate 
is to transform the duration model into a sequence of discrete choice equations defined on the 
surviving population at each spell’s duration. In this case, we define a binary variable yt that 
takes the value of one when the worker exit from the current state, and is otherwise assumed to 
be zero. This expression has exactly the same form as the likelihood function of a discrete 
choice model where yt is the binary endogenous dependent variable, once we have rearranged 
the database so that there are as many rows per individual as there are time units -in this case, 
quarters- of worker permanence in the initial situation (Allison, 1982; Jenkins, 1995). Hence, 
our likelihood function for each individual is:   
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where Πt is the conditional exit rate at time t . To estimate this transition probability, we use a 
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where Pt has been defined above (expression 1). 
5  Do regional subsidies influence the exit rate from a permanent contract? 
In this section, we discuss the main results of our analysis. As stated earlier, the latter centres on 
the estimation of a duration model that uses a triple difference approach to identify the causal 
                                                 
27 From Tables 1 and 2 we learn that the policy was only used in certain regions for several years. In addition, some 
regions upheld the policy for the duration of the period in question, while other only began to implement it a few 








effect of regional subsidies on the exit rate from a permanent contract. In order to obtain a better 
understanding of the causal incidence of these subsidies, we proceed in several steps.  
First, we estimate the average treatment effect of the subsidies on the exit rate from a permanent 
contract for potentially eligible workers and we also check to see whether these effects vary by 
type of firm or employment position. Second, we wonder whether the incidence of the subsidies 
can vary by job tenure. Finally, since a number of national policies designed to boost stable 
employment were also effective during the period we analyzed, our sample includes workers 
who stood to benefit from both national and regional subsidies. In order to test whether or not 
the incidence of regional subsidies varied by the presence or absence of the national ones for 
any given contract, we estimate another duration model in which the policy variable interacts 
with a dummy variable introduced to control for the existence of national payroll tax deductions 
benefits. 
Our statistics have shown that eligible workers face shorter employment durations. These 
observed differences could be attributed to the regional subsidy or to other individual and/or job 
characteristics. If, from our estimation, we find that eligible workers tend to leave their 
permanent contract sooner than ineligible ones, then we should conclude that regional subsidies 
negatively affect the labour market stability of subsidized permanent workers. This result would 
imply the existence of some unexpected side effects produced by the regional subsidies. These 
side effects should be considered when evaluating the benefits of this policy since they 
decrement its potential positive effects on the permanent employment rate. In this vein, 
Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) state that a possible indirect effect of job creation subsidies is 
to raise the hiring and firing rate of permanent workers without altering the permanent 
employment rate. In particular, they argue that the hiring subsidy could have positive effects on 
the permanent employment rate only when it is equal or lower than the firing costs. Hence, this 
hypothesis is even more interesting when applied to the Spanish case, where regional and 
national policies coexist simultaneously.   
Our study allows for heterogeneous effects of the policy by age group. We cross the policy 
variable “Dijt” with the worker’s age group, dividing the latter into the three main age categories 
established by both regional and national eligibility rules: under 30, between 30 to 45, and over 
45. Gender is another important policy determinant and is considered in our analysis by 
estimating separate duration models for men and women. Finally, we allow for the fact that the 
policy variable may have a non-linear effect on the exit from permanent employment, by 
modelled it as a polynomial of degree two.  
For ease of exposition, the main results of each of our estimated duration models are 
summarized below (Table 9) and further detailed in the appendix (Table A.1).
28 Table 9 first 
presents the estimated exit probability from a permanent contract, computed at the mean of the 
explanatory variables for each group of workers -defined by age and gender. Then, in the right 
hand side of the table, it gives the estimated causal effect of the regional subsidies on the exit 
                                                 








from the permanent contract. We obtained this measurement from the total change in the 
estimated exit probability of eligible versus ineligible workers that can be directly attributed to 
the presence of subsidy funds. When both of the coefficients associated with the policy are 
statistically significant, we interpret this as evidence of the existence of a causal effect.
29    
Table 9: Causal effect of the policy on the exit rate from permanent employment (1995-2004)  
  Exit Prob. (Without Policy)  Change in Prob. due to the policy 
  Women  Men  Women  Men 
< 30  3.77%  3.05%  6.43%  10.98%** 
30-45 3.30%  2.93%  5.23%  9.62%* 
>45 3.69%  3.06%  -6.72%  6.05%* 
 
Notes: The estimated probability is obtained at the average of the observed characteristics and at the eighth quarter of the 
contract. The average change caused by the policy is computed at the average of the wage subsidy for each group of 
workers. The symbol “*” means that the coefficients associated with the policy variable were both statistically significant 
at 90% and “**” means that they were both statistically significant at 95%. 
 
From the results shown in Table 9, we learn that regional subsidies seem not to influence the 
exit rate from a permanent contract among eligible female workers, whereas they have a low 
positive effect among eligible male ones.
30 The results obtained for women are not statistically 
significant for any age group, while for men the effect is positive and statistically significant. 
The exit rate from a permanent contract among male eligible workers increases by 10.98% for 
younger workers, by 9.62% for middle-aged ones and by 6.05% for older ones.
31  
Nevertheless, these results refer to the average treatment effect, which may vary by job tenure 
and/or contract type. In particular, our statistical analysis has shown that the exit rate from a 
permanent contract during the first year behaves differently than it does thereafter, a tendency 
which may be related to the effect of job creation subsidies on hiring costs relative to firing 
costs (which in Spain depend on job tenure). That is, since the job creation subsidies reduce 
hiring costs but have no effect on firing costs, such funds may simply encourage the job 
turnover rate among eligible workers. At the point which firing costs go beyond the drop in 
                                                 
29 Standard errors are corrected to take into account that we may have different spells of the same individual. That is, 
an individual might fulfil more than once the criteria to be in the sample and this is taken into account in the 
estimation.  
30 It is worth to mention that when the control group includes all types of workers with permanent contracts, 
regardless of whether or not their previous work situations made them eligible for RWS, the results differ notably 
from those presented in Table 9. The effect of RWS appears to be positive and statistically significant for all workers. 
For instance, in this estimation RWS appear to raise the female exit rate from a permanent contract by 14% for 
middle-aged women and 17% for women over the age of 45. The effect is even more marked for men, rising by 21%, 
24% and 5% for younger, middle-aged and older male workers, respectively. However, as we have presented in Table 
9, the results totally change when considering a proper control group, what confirms the need for a properly 
definition of such control group in causal analysis.    
31 We have also estimated the model by including the data on job transitions lasting less than 7 days. The estimated 
causal effects are slightly lower in this case. Thus, for young male workers the effect is 8.8%, while for middle-aged 








hiring costs, the incentives of firing the subsidized worker increase.
32 In order to determine 
whether the treatment effects differ among workers with different job tenures, we also estimate 
a model in which the policy variable is interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value 
one during the first year of the contract, and is otherwise fixed at zero.  
Table 10 gives the main results of this new estimation. The most striking result here is that, in 
all cases, the estimated effect of the policy is statistically significant and positive during the 
employee’s first year of contract. That is, this exercise suggests that regional subsidies may 
actually increase the exit rate from a permanent contract among eligible workers of both genders 
during the first year of hire. This effect seems to increase with age, mainly among men (for 
whom the causal effect ranges from about 13%, for workers aged 45 and under, to 25.74% for 
older ones). The effect vanishes as contract tenure lengthens, even becoming negative among 
relatively older workers (-21.15%). That is, once an eligible worker has held onto a contract for 
more than one year, her probability of exiting from that contract is lower than it is for ineligible 
female workers over the age of 30 and male workers over the age of 45. Thus, the exit 
probability drops by 20.37% for middle-aged female workers and by 21.15% and 54.16% for 
male and female older workers, respectively. This last effect is more relevant for men than for 
women in the sense that more than 40% of exits in the sample take place during the first year of 
the contract in the case of women, while in the case of men this portion drops to around 28%. 
For younger female workers and middle-aged male ones, the effects are not statistically 
significant. Only for young male workers, the sign of the effect remains the same as those 
obtained for shorter contract periods, although at a lower scale (about 8%). When we look at the 
net effect of theses subsidies on employment duration by computing the expected duration we 
obtain that the negative incidence of the subsidies over eligible workers predominates in all 
cases, although it is large for females than for males. The effect is more important for older 
workers than for younger ones. For instance, average expected duration decreases for eligible 
older women by 20.52% and for older workers by around 10%, versus illegible ones. For the 
rest of workers average expected duration for eligible workers versus illegible ones drops 
around 2%, except for the case of middle age female ones who also experiment drops in 
expected duration in permanent employment of around 9.6%. Thus, although we estimate a 
reduction in the hazard rate for older workers once one year has elapsed, the effect over the first 
year of the contract is more important what makes the complete effect over expected duration to 
be negative in all cases, and specially for older workers. 
These results are highly interesting since it might indicate that some firms effectively use 
regional subsidies to reduce the cost of hiring workers on a permanent basis. Meanwhile, also 
the opposite result emerges indicating that other firms might be using these subsidies to reduce 
the hiring costs of new employees who finally experience short-term jobs. That is the incidence 
of the regional subsidies partially depends on the hiring practices of Spanish firms. Notice that 
previous empirical studies have already pointed out that some firms do use temporary contracts 
                                                 
32 This is relevant since in many regions subsidized workers should remain, at least, one year with the current 








as screening devices while some Spanish firms seem to be almost exclusively reliant on 
temporary contracts as a means of maintaining external and internal flexibility (Guell and 
Petrongolo, 2007 and Rebollo 2008). It seems that subsidized permanent contracts may be also 
having this screening role documented before for temporary contracts. 
 
Table 10: Estimated Causal effect of the policy on the exit rate from permanent employment: 
the influence of job tenure (1995-2004)  
    Exit Prob.(Without Policy)  Change in Prob. due to the policy 
    Women  Men  Women  Men 
<  30  5.11% 3.22% 9.26%** 12.90%** 




>45 4.15%  2.94%  16.67%**  25.74%** 
< 30  3.22%  2.60%  4.61%  8.82%* 




>45 2.60%  2.37%  -54.16%** -21.15%** 
 
  Notes:  The estimated probability is obtained at the average of the observed characteristics and at the 12th and the 24
th 
quarter of the contract. The average change caused by the policy is computed at the average of the wage subsidy for each 
group of workers. The symbol “*” means that the coefficients associated with the policy variable were both statistically 
significant at 90% and “**” means that they were both statistically significant at 95%. 
 
 
We are also interested in studying whether these average treatment effects differ by job type. 
For this purpose, we have estimated the initial specification –Table 9-, allowing for a 
heterogeneous effect by firm size, activity sector and job skill level. Improved knowledge of 
how treatment effect responds to different employer characteristics may help the design of the 
policy we are discussing. The results displayed in Table 11 indicate that the causal effect for 
men under the age of 30 tends to arise in the context of smaller and medium-size firms, in those 
firms associated with the service sector and when the job skill level is low or medium. In the 
case of middle-aged men, the effects are only statistically significant in the industry sector and 
for low qualified jobs. Among female workers, the effects on younger workers appears to be 
similar to those obtained for young male workers; that is, they are positive and statistically 
significant when the job is with a smaller firm, one associated with the service sector, and/or 
when it is low qualified. In the case of women over the age of 45, all of the statistically 
significant effects are negative and generally occur in firms with more than 20 employees and in 
low qualified jobs.   
In sum, regional subsidies may favour the exit from a permanent contract among eligible 








around low qualified jobs and those in the service sector.
33 By contrast, the effects are not 
statistically significant or are even negative for longer contract durations. The latter effect is 
particularly relevant for women over the age of 30 and older male workers.    
Table 11: Estimated Causal effect of the policy on the exit rate from permanent employment: 
the interaction with other firm and job characteristics (1995-2004)  
    Women Men 
   <30  30-45  >45  <30  30-45  >45 
< 20  14.61%**  4.57%  4.81%  9.20%**  4.26%  7.10%  Firm  Size 
20-100 11.77%  -5.41%  -34.92%** 8.44%**  -0.26%**  14.63% 
  >100 3.18%  3.98%  -35.99%** -0.63%  9.86%  -4.70% 
Industry 0.48%  -15.60%  -14.60%** 2.00%  30.61**  29.37**  Activity 
Sector  Construction 25.72%  -40.49%  -82.15%** -2.18%** 7.63%  11.48% 
  Services 10.74%**  1.94%  -11.53%** 8.33%** -1.40% -1.67%** 
Low -1.78%**  -7.75%  -22.75%** 6.73%**  12.36%**  19.01%  Job Skill 
Level  Medium 8.88%  7.14%**  -14.89%* 10.41%** 11.37%**  2.71% 
  High 0.61%**  -11.22%  16.84%  0.68%  -7.68%**  6.43% 
 
  Notes: See Table 9.  
5.1   Does the causal effect of regional subsidies vary with the availability of national 
subsidies?  
In the previous section, we argued that an unintended effect of the policy under discussion is to 
reduce the duration of permanent contracts for some eligible workers, thereby increasing their 
job turnover rate. Since national payroll tax deductions were available for some permanent hires 
during the same analytical period, we wonder whether these two policies may have had 
complementary effects or not. We are particularly interested in analysing whether the causal 
effect of regional subsidies on an eligible worker who also benefits from payroll tax deductions 
is greater or lower than that for an eligible worker with no such deductions. In the statistical 
section, we have shown that the empirical exit rate from a permanent contract differs markedly 
by the availability of national subsidies, particularly during the first year of employment. 
As we noted at the beginning of this paper, employers who open new permanent positions for 
eligible workers can obtain important deductions in total labour costs by combining both type of 
subsidies. Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) show that for economies with strong unemployment 
compensation packages and stringent employment protection laws, hiring subsidies can actually 
decrease permanent employment by inducing a disproportionate number of firms to replace old 
                                                 
33 We have also estimated the model by assuming heterogeneous treatment effects for these job characteristics and, at 
the same time, allowing the effect of the policy being different over the course of the employment spell. Again, we 
obtain that the strongest effect occurs during the first year of employment. Thus, among low qualified workers the 
exit rate from permanent contract is maximum (20% for women aged more than 45 and 26% among the young ones). 








jobs with new ones, thereby leading to a higher level of turnover. Their main argument is that, 
while hiring subsidies do indeed stimulate job creation, once a job has been created the 
opportunity cost of keeping the match rises, since a firm need only create a new position to 
receive the same subsidy again. This opportunity cost is even higher when the job creation 
subsidy is combined with a discount in payroll taxes, since the latter normally last for two years 
(excepting those for older workers). In this regard, both policies may be favouring the labour 
market rotation of the workers who benefit from them.
34  
In this estimation we allow the policy effect to vary with the contract duration as we did in the 
previous section. Table A.2 (Appendix) gives detailed results of these estimations. The main 
result obtained here (shown in Table 12) is that the causal incidence found previously mainly 
applies to eligible workers—particularly female ones—who are in their first year of contract 
and were hired under a contract carrying national payroll tax deductions (CIF contract type). 
These results differ notably by gender and age group. With respect to female workers under the 
age of 45, we obtain that regional subsidies increase the exit rate from permanent employment 
during the first year of employment among eligible workers -versus illegible ones-, holding 
contracts with national subsidies. In general, the exit rate increases by 23.98% among eligible 
young women and by 19.00% among middle-aged ones. Among these eligible female workers 
whose contract does not include payroll tax deductions, the exit rate decreases during the first 
year of employment by 19.05% for young women and by 7.34% for middle age ones. After one 
year of employment the incidence of regional subsidies on the exit rate from the permanent 
contract seem not be as much as relevant as before and the exit probability only increases 3.57% 
for eligible workers in the case of young workers holding a permanent contract without 
discounts in payroll taxes. For the rest of female workers groups aged below 45 the regional 
subsidies decrease the exit rate by between 1.5% and 1.9%. The results are slightly different for 
women over the age of 45.
35 For them, the effects of regional subsidies are not statistically 
during the first year of the contract. For contracts longer than a year, the exit rate among eligible 
workers appears to have decreased by around 24% for contracts without national subsidies 
while the effects are not statistically significant for the other types.  
Table 12: Causal effect of the policy on the exit probability from a permanent contract: the 
effect of national subsidies availability (1997-2004)  
    Estimated exit Prob. (no policy)  Change in Prob. due to the policy 
    Women Men Women Men 
   CIO  CIF  CIO  CIF CIO  CIF  CIO  CIF 
Contract  < 30  10.39%  6.58%  8.56%  4.42%  -19.05%* 23.98%**  5.08%**  7.46%** 
                                                 
34 As we pointed out earlier, the MCVL dataset does not allow us to identify the types of firing costs associated with 
each type of permanent contract. Data provided by the Spanish Employment Agency indicates that all contracts 
without national subsidies have high firing costs (45 days of compensation per year worked). Firing costs for the 
nationally subsidized contracts can be either high (45 days) or low (33 days) depending on the firm. However, a close 
look at all of contracts signed in 2006 that received a national subsidy shows that nearly 66% of them carried low 
firing costs (33 days of compensation per year worked).  
35 For this group of workers, this estimation does not capture the fact that regional subsidies might reduce the exit 








30-45 7.89% 5.37% 6.41%  3.39% -7.34%** 19.00%**  6.70%**  -10.47%**
>45 8.70%  4.80%  5.17% 2.97%  3.61% -0.37% 14.01%**  28.33%**
< 30  5.54%  5.36%  5.76%  4.93%  3.57%  -1.96%**  3.04%**  17.76%**
30-45 4.15% 4.35% 4.27%  3.79% -1.74%** -1.59%**  3.89%**  45.58%**
Contract 
Length 
>12  >45 4.58%  3.88%  3.44% 3.32%  -24.62%** -0.51% -1.95%**  -16.54%**
 
Notes: See Table 10. 
           CIO=Permanent contract without national subsidies. CIF=Permanent contract with national subsidies.  
 
Turning to male employees, we can observe that, as in the general model, regional subsidies 
increased the exit rate from the permanent contract for almost all eligible workers in our sample. 
For young workers, we find that these subsidies always increased their exit rate, with the effects 
being clearly more pronounced when the he held a nationally subsidized contract (7.46% versus 
5.08% for the first year contract and 17.76% versus 3.04% afterwards). In contrast to our result 
for female workers, we find that for males, the estimated effects increased after the first year of 
the contract, when they rose from 7.46% to 17.76%.  
The effect of regional subsidies on middle-aged male workers holding different types of 
contracts differed from that found for younger workers. For this group, we find that these 
subsidies increased the exit rate among those holding contracts without national tax deductions, 
which was not the case among those with such deductions. However, for contracts lasting 
longer than one year, the results obtained for middle-aged male workers resemble those 
obtained for younger workers, although the effect over the exit rate is even greater (45.58% 
among those with national subsidies). Nevertheless, these results must be treated with caution, 
since the proportion of workers with national subsidies is lower for this group than it is for other 
ones.
36 
Finally, for male workers over the age of 45 the main difference in the causal effect of the 
policy depends on the duration of the contract. During the first year of employment, eligible 
workers with national subsidies faced a greater causal effect (28.33%) than did those without 
national subsidies (14.01%). The economic relevance of this heightened risk of job loss among 
older eligible male workers should be underlined here, since it affected such a high proportion 
of the sample population. By contrast, for contracts lasting longer than one year the subsidies 
had just the opposite effect, lowering the exit probabilities among eligible workers with (-
16.54%) and without (-1.95%) national discounts in payroll taxes. 
Hence, we have found that the incidence of regional subsidies on the labour market stability of 
the workers in our sample differs markedly by contract length and type. With regard to the 
former, the most relevant effect of these subsidies on the exit rate from a permanent contract 
centres on those contracts that also benefit from national payroll tax deductions. That is, the 
unintended side effects of the regional policy might be reinforced when the worker also benefit 
from national policies. The results are less homogeneous with regard to contract duration. Here, 
regional subsidies have significant causal effects on eligible female workers during the first year 
                                                 
36 These differences mainly result from the eligibility restrictions for permanent contract with national payroll tax 








of the contract, increasing the exit rate from the permanent contract with national subsidies. The 
latter effect also arises among older male workers and, to a lesser extent, among male workers 
under the age of 30.  
The interpretation of these results is not straightforward. On the one hand, one could affirm that 
regional subsidies applied in combination with national payroll tax discounts help firms “try 
out” different workers for permanent positions by financing the rotation of workers during the 
early stages of their contracts. Hence, it seems that the joint availability of both national and 
regional subsidies may be cancelling out the possible negative effect of firing costs on both the 
hiring and firing of specific kinds of workers (essentially younger and female ones). 
An alternative view is that firms are using these new subsidized permanent contracts as a 
substitute for temporary contracts. That is, Spanish labour policies that target permanent 
employment can be seen as one way to reduce the differences, mainly in terms of labour costs, 
between permanent and temporary contracts. Recall that job creations subsidies seem to 
compensate for the firing costs associated to permanent contracts. In this regard, Cebrian, 
Moreno and Toharia (2005) also point to the greater instability of the new permanent contracts –
benefited with lower firing costs-, introduced with the 1997 reform, as compared to the ordinary 
ones –with high firing costs-, and conclude that encouraging employers to reduce the number of 
temporary employees by subsidizing new permanent contracts which carry lower firing costs 
might be leading them simply to redefine these contracts without enhancing employment 
stability.  
6  Conclusions 
Policies that aim to foster stable employment by subsidising new permanent contracts currently 
stand out as one of the main tools to active labour market policies, not only in Spain but also 
across Europe. Despite this undeniable political relevance, the available empirical literature 
stresses the limited benefits of such policies and points to the sometimes unexpected side effects 
that they may produce. These conclusions have been voiced in a number of studies, including 
those by Calforms (1994), Martin and Grub (2001) and Mortensen and Pissarides (2001).  
Since 1997, several Spanish regional governments as well as the Spanish national government 
have implemented a number of different policies designed to reduce the high rate of temporary 
employment in the Spanish labour market by targeting specific worker groups.  
In this paper we study the causal influence of job creation subsidies designed by regional 
governments on the duration of the subsidized permanent contract. Our main goal has been to 
evaluate whether such subsidies might cause certain side effects (such as increased job turnover 
among eligible workers with a permanent contract) that would limit their potential benefits on 
the permanent employment rate. We work with a longitudinal database, using a triple difference 








From the results presented above, we conclude that regional subsidies influence the labour 
market stability of some workers, but that the effects of these funds differ markedly by contract 
duration and type. In particular, we obtain that eligible workers are more likely to exit from the 
permanent contract during the first year of the contract and that this probability increases when 
the contract also benefited from national payroll tax deductions. Moreover, these effects seem to 
be clustered around low-qualified male workers in smaller firms and around jobs in the service 
sector (for all younger workers) and the industry sector (for younger male workers).  
These estimated causal effects of regional subsidies on the exit probability from a permanent 
contract seem to be more significant than those we obtained elsewhere for temporary and 
unemployed workers on the entrance probability to a permanent contract (see García-Pérez and 
Rebollo, 2009). Hence, it seems that regional subsidies that favour the creation of new 
permanent positions may be encouraging firms not only to hire more permanent workers, but 
also to fire these workers more frequently. As a result, such subsidies ultimately do very little to 
increase the prevalence of permanent employment in the labour market to which they are 
applied. This raises the question as to whether or not such subsidies ultimately serve to increase 
labour market rotation rather than labour market stability.  
Our result accords with the main conclusions of Mortensen and Pissarides (2001). They argue 
that although regional subsidies are designed to support employment, once a job is created the 
opportunity cost of keeping it increases, giving rise to a higher firing rate. In the case of Spain, 
this effect seems also to be reinforced by the existence of national subsidies.  
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Table A.1: Main Results for the complete model (1995-2004): Exit from the Permanent contract 
   Women  Men 
   Coef.  T-S  Coef.  T-S 
ln(t) 0.188  7.16  0.094  3.89 
Ln(t)^2 -0.208  -18.22  -0.150  -14.44 
T=4 quarter  0.143  7.93  -0.055  -3.05 
T=8 quarter  -0.058  -2.08  -0.038  -1.55 
Contract 
Duration 
T=12 quarter  -0.086  -2.05  -0.146  -3.99 
Dijt*(Age< 30)  0.011  0.93  0.031  3.3 
Dijt^2*(Age< 30)  4E-04  0.45  -0.001  -1.7 
Dijt*(Age30-45) 0.016  1.15  0.023  1.79 
Dijt^2*(Age30-45) -0.001  -0.84  -4E-04  -0.34 
Dijt*(Age>45) -0.026  -1.18  -8E-04  -0.04 
Policy Variables 
Dijt^2*(Age>45) 0.002  1.33  0.003  1.92 
Age -0.158  -27.22  -0.135  -25.09  Personal 
Characteristics  Age^2 0.002  20.09  0.001  17.76 
  Immigrant 0.742  25.85  0.811  36.26 
Age groups  Age <30  -0.581  -0.9  -1.4  -2.63 
  Age 30-45  0.499  0.74  -0.129  -0.23 
Job 
Characteristics  Part-time   0.19  14.42  0.505  28.87 
  Layoff 1.068  85.83  0.957  83.32 
Job Qualification High   -0.851  -33.62  -0.645  -30.38 
  Medium-High   -0.567  -34.6  -0.325  -20.19 
  Medium-Low   -0.292  -22.03  -0.215  -17.5 
Firm Size  20-100 Employee  0.182  9.87  0.203  10.98 
  5-20 Employee  0.203  11.01  0.276  15.01 
  < 5 Employee  0.251  15.23  0.382  21.91 
  New Firm  0.123  9.82  0.183  15.42 
  Private 0.376  9.73  0.393  7.43 
  Temporary Help Agency  0.357  4.56  0.378  3.87 
  Contract with national subsidies   -0.232  -19.35  -0.373  -30.68 
Construction 0.019  0.41  0.148  7.4  Sector of Activity 
Services 0.312  16.2  0.396  26.81 
Temp. Contract (Previous)  -0.198 -8.01  -0.256  -9.28 
Conversion From Temp. Contract  -1.236  -46.55  -1.243  -43.29 
First Spell  0.169  4.81  0.012  0.33 
Previous 
Labour Path 
Nº of Unemployment Spells 0.086  56.41  0.093  64.07 
  Constant term  -5.566  -6.81  -4.604  -7.55 
Note: In the estimation we also include dummy variables by years, quarters and regions, as well as the 










Table A.2: Main Results of the model for the period 1997-2004: Exit from the Permanent 
contract 
   Women  Men 
   Coef.  T-S  Coef.  T-S 
Contract Length  ln(t) 0.425  12.53  0.166  5.78 
  Ln(t)^2 -0.348  -24.28  -0.233  -18.64 
  Ln(t)* “Fomento” type  -0.658  -13.63  -0.218  -4.42 
  Ln(t)^2 0.396  18.96  0.282  13.68 
  T=2 quarter  0.145  7.92  -0.033  -1.79 
  T=4 quarter  -0.1  -3.5  -0.055  -2.2 
  T=12 quarter  0.02  0.47  -0.124  -3.29 
Policy Variables  Dijt*(Age < 30)*(T<=4)*”Fomento” type  0.046  3.49  0.017  2.96 
  Dijt*(Age < 30)*(T>4)*”Fomento” type  -0.004  -3.76  0.039  5.89 
  Dijt*(Age< 30)*(T<=4)  -0.046  -3.88  0.012  2.75 
  Dijt*(Age<30)*(T>4) 0.007  6.55  0.007  1.43 
  Dijt*(Age30-45)*(T<=4)*”Fomento” type  0.039  2.5  -0.026  -2.15 
  Dijt*(Age30-45)*(T>4)*”Fomento” type  -0.003  -2.49  0.089  8.74 
  Dijt*(Age30-45)*(T<=4) -0.017  -0.88  0.016  2.65 
  Dijt*(Age30-45)*(T>4) 0.004  2.02  0.009  1.33 
  Dijt*(Age>45)*(T<=4)*”Fomento” type  -8E-04  -0.03  0.057  5.17 
  Dijt*(Age >45)*(T>4)*”Fomento” type -0.001  -0.51  -0.041  -2.61 
  Dijt*(Age >45)*(T<=4)  0.007  2.75  0.03  2.77 
  Dijt*(Age>45)*(T>4) -0.056  -1.89  -0.004  -0.31 
Personal 
Characteristics  Age -0.161  -27.02  -0.136  -24.94 
  Age^2 0.002  19.96  0.001  17.61 
Age groups  Age <30  -0.73  -2.87  -0.201  -0.83 
  Age <30*”Fomento” type 0.144  2.49  -0.127  -2.91 
  Age 30-45  -0.425  -1.58  -0.004  -0.01 
  Age 30-45*”Fomento” type 0.230  3.66  -0.089  -1.83 
  Immigrant 0.731  25.4  0.799  35.76 
Job Characteristics  Part-time 0.184  13.73  0.505  28.61 
Job Qualification  High (Job Qualification)  -0.847 -32.9  -0.638  -29.63 
  Medium-High (Job Qualification) -0.557  -33.4  -0.321  -19.63 
  Medium-Low (Job Qualification) -0.285  -21.08  -0.215  -17.21 
  Layoff 1.063  84.01  0.95  81.52 
Firm Size  20-100 Employee  0.174  9.35  0.197  10.51 
  5-20 Employee  0.203  10.86  0.278  14.94 
  < 5 Employee  0.247  14.73  0.377  21.32 
  New Firm  0.124  9.65  0.184  15.24 
  Private Firm  0.422  10.35  0.425  7.65 
  “Fomento” type  -0.397  -6.91  -0.681  -14.4 
Sector of Activity  Construction 0.021  0.45  0.146  7.21 
  Services 0.299  15.92  0.399  26.56 
Previous Labour 
Path  Temp. Contract (Previous Spell) -0.196  -7.87  -0.257  -9.29 
  Conversion From Temp. Contract  -1.217  -45.43  -1.189  -41.22 
  First Spell  0.194  5.4  0.044  1.14 
  Nº of Unemployment Spells 0.084  54.37  0.092  62.56 
  Constant term  -0.682  -2.46  -1.481  -5.5 
  N o t e :  “Fomento” type means that the permanent contract has national subsidies. 